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Arbitrage: The Case of Program Trading
I. Introduction
When stock index futures and options were first introduced in the
early 1980' s, the important economic role they could play was stressed.
These contracts can provide risk reduction benefits through hedging and
cost savings when used to adjust portfolio positions to new information.
The former because the markets where these instruments are traded bring
together hedgers and speculators so that they can share risk. The
latter because transaction costs are considerably lower in these markets
than in the stock market, so that the composition of a portfolio can be
changed at a much lower cost by using futures and options than by trad-
ing individual stocks or baskets of stocks.
On the negative side, the impact that the trading of futures and
options indices would have on the underlying cash or stock market was
down played. In particular, when the stock market experienced unusually
volatile swings in prices especially around the "triple witching hour,"
the headlines of financial media in recent years has often singled out
the computer-generated "program trading" as the villains, rather than
attributing the stock market move to the fundamental factors that in-
fluence the market. The most common form of program trading involves
taking a position in a stock index futures contract and simultaneously
taking an opposite position in a basket of stocks that replicate the
underlying index of the futures contract. Speculators' watch the spread
between the index and its futures contract, with the hope of putting
on a stock index arbitrage program as soon as the spread reveals an
-2-
arbitrage opportunity. A profit is guaranteed any time the futures
prices deviate from the stock prices by more than the "cost of carry"
(in its simplest form, the cost of short-term money less dividends
received during the holding period).
The financial and popular press has been reporting with increasing
frequency on "program trading" and its destabilizing influence on the
stock market. Congress, the SEC, and the CFTC have shown increasing
2interest in the increase in volatility in the stock market. To
arbitragers, who trade simultaneously in both spot and futures markets
to profit on small price discrepancies, volatility means profit.
Arbitrage based on program trading in recent years is the most popular
technique employed by intermarket traders, who frequently swap baskets
of stocks for offsetting index futures to take advantage of price dis-
crepancies. Surely, index arbitrage transactions may move markets.
For example, if an index futures sells at a substantial premium over
the underlying securities by more than the carrying cost, program
traders will purchase the basket of underlying stocks which will lead
to the rise of stock prices. Note, however, that the positive expec-
tations, which initiate the rise in the futures price, are what trigger
the transaction in the spot market. Investors may initially act on
those expectations through the futures markets because transaction
costs are lower. Recent evidence linking the change in futures prices
and the subsequent change in spot prices has been provided by Finnerty
and Park (1987).
The purpose of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on
the frequency of program trading and the potential return of such
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activity. The next section deals with a discussion of program trad-
ing. This is followed by a section on the data and methodology used
in the study. The final two sections contain empirical results and
brief conclusion, respectively.
II. Program Trading
In general, program trading can be defined as the purchase or sale
of a portfolio of securities by institutional investors as if the
portfolio were one stock. This action is possible because of the
developments in computer technology that allow orders to buy or sell a
basket of securities to be routed and executed as if only one security
3
were involved. Program trading is a way for the institutional investor
to capitalize on pricing disparities between the stock index futures
and its underlying stock index. By the law of one price, the same
portfolio of stocks cannot be bought or sold in the markets simultan-
eously at different prices. For if this occurred an informed arbi-
trageur could buy the cheap portfolio and sell the expensive portfolio
and guarantee a risk free return. If the index futures is more expen-
sive, the arbitrageur can buy a portfolio of stocks and sell futures
contracts. This is called a buy program . If the index futures is
cheaper than the underlying equities, the arbitrageur can sell a port-
folio of stocks and buy futures contracts executing a sell program .
Once the artitrage opportunity has been identified and the program
trader has taken the appropriate position, the traders may wait until
the futures contract matures. At maturity, the value of the futures
contract will by definition equal the value of the underlying stocks.
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So that, the program traders merely unwind their positions, i.e., buy
stocks for a sell program and sell stocks for a buy program, and take
their profits. A question which we address in this study is whether or
not it is feasible to generate returns by dynamic program trading in
excess of the simple buy or sell and hold strategy. In effect, we are
interested in trading the basis to generate profits. The basis is
defined as the difference between the value of the underlying stock
portfolio (index) and the futures price.
At the expiration of the futures contract, the futures price and
the value of the underlying index must be the same, or the basis must
be zero. The process of the basis moving from a positive or negative
value toward zero is called convergence. Given the arrival of new
information, the basis may change and provide the program trader with
additional profitable opportunities above the simple buy or sell and
hold strategy. The basis of an index futures contract in its simplest
form can be defined as:
S (r-d)T
where
F is the futures price at time t
t
S is the spot price at time t
r is the risk free rate
d is the dividend yield of the securities in the underlying index
T is the time to maturity of the futures contract.
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Note that the cost of carry is represented by r-d in equation (1).
Given this definition, we can redefine program trading opportunities
as the departure of the basis from the theoretical value shown by
equation (1). We can imagine for example a change in expectations
about interest rates causing r to fall, ceteris paribus, the basis will
narrow. If the futures market reacts to this new information prior to
the individual stocks which constitute the index, an arbitrage oppor-
tunity may exist because the basis may be different from its theoreti-
cally correct value. A program trader looking for this divergence of
the basis from its correct value can institute a program trade which
will guarantee a risk free return in excess of r. An important issue
at this point is the feasibility of the futures market reacting more
4
rapidly to new information than the equities market. One of the argu-
ments presented above for the existence of the futures market was that
investors would be able to make portfolio adjustments more cheaply by
using futures instead of trading the underlying stocks, therefore we
consider it feasible for the above scenario to occur.
Equation (1) can be rewritten as:
F
t T
^
- 1 - (r-d>^ (2)
Based on economic conditions, the values of r and d are determined
outside of the futures and stock markets. The value of T changes in
a predetermined fashion for each day of trading. Given exogenously
determined r and d on a given day (T) , the prices in the futures and
spot market must be of a certain value in order to preclude arbitrage
opportunities. This being the case, the program trader is continually
-6-
looking for a divergence of the actual basis from the relationship pre-
dicted by equation (2).
It is also worthwhile to note that the relationship between r and d
determines whether the futures contract is selling at a premium or a
discount relative to the spot index. If r is greater than d, the basis
will trade at a premium, i.e., the futures price is higher than the
spot index. Conversely if r is less than d, the futures will trade at
a discount. Given the foregoing discussions, a profitable arbitrage
may be possible which generates returns in excess of merely executing
a program trade and waiting until the futures contract matures.
Merely execute buy or sell program whenever the basis is at a premium
or discount and close the position if the sign of the basis changes,
i.e., the basis premium becomes a discount or vice versa. This is the
trading rule we test in this study. Namely, if the basis exceeds or is
less than the expected theoretical value, keep executing the appropriate
program trade till expiration. The next section describes the data set
and methodology used in the study.
III. Data and Methodology
The complete intraday transaction data for both the Major Market
Index (MMI) and the Maxi Major Market Index (MMMI) was used. The time
period covered for the MMI is from August 23, 1984 to August 15, 1986,
which encompasses 24 futures contracts. For the MMMI, the period covers
from August 10, 1985 to August 15, 1986, or 10 contracts. The MMI
is a price-weighted index of 20 blue-chip stocks, including 15 of the
30 Dow Jones industrials. The only difference between the MMI and the
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MMMI lies in the trading units: the MMI is 100 times the index whereas
the MMMI is 250 times the index. The choice of these narrow blue-chip
indices are considered appropriate since they are cheaper vehicles for
arbitrage.
For each trade over the life of each contract the value of the
basis was calculated using equation (2). The daily mean and standard
deviation of the trade by trade basis was then calculated for each day
(t). Based on the mean and standard deviation (X
,
a ) for day t, the
following trading rule was applied to day t+1 ' s transactions:
1. If
F(t+1)
S(t+1)
- 1 > K
t
+ „ Execute a Buy Program
2. If
F(t+1)
S(t+1)
- 1 < X - a , Execute a Sell Program
where j is each individual transaction which occurred on day t+1. This
rule was also applied for several filter sizes, a , 2a and 3a to
investigate if there was any relationship between the size of the
divergence of the basis from its theoretical value and the profitabil-
ity of the program trade.
Two types of program trade were examined: one is static and the
other is dynamic. First, once a program trade was executed and a
position taken, the rate of return of that program was calculated
assuming the position was unwound at the expiration of the futures
contract. This was calculated by adding the return from the spot
position to the return from the futures position. We called this
-8-
strategy "Execute and Hold" strategy. Additionally, the basis was
monitored from the time of the trade until expiration, looking for a
reversal in the basis. If the reversal occurred, the program position
was unwound and traders wait until next signal. Following this pro-
cedure until the futures maturity was called "Dynamic Program Trading"
strategy. It was assumed that the programs were executed and liquidated
under either of two conditions. The first was that the program was
traded at the prices of the next transaction where both the futures and
spot trade occurred at exactly the same instant in time. We called
this simultaneous trading . The second was that the spot was executed
at the next spot price and the futures was executed at the next futures
price after the spot. This was called delayed trading . This calcula-
tion was necessary partly because of the way the spot and futures
prices were recorded on the data tape. Futures prices were recorded as
they actually occurred and the spot prices were reported at irregular
intervals of approximately 15 seconds or 4 times per minute. This
could cause more than one futures price to be associated with a spot
price, i.e., there were more than one futures trade in a 15 second
interval. In general, the first calculation (simultaneous trading)
reduced the number of trades, whereas there were more trades under the
less restrictive second assumption. After a position was closed out
the rate of return of the program was calculated and the computer con-
tinued to search for arbitrage opportunities until the contract matured.
IV. Results
For the MMMI contract, there were ten contracts which were initiated
and expired during the period. In Table 1 the program trading rates of
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return are shown for the execute and hold to expiration strategy and
the dynamic program trading strategy under two assumptions about how
the program trade position was unwound. The execute and hold strategy
performance compared to the dynamic program trading strategy is shown
in Table 2.
For the MMI contract, there were 24 contracts which were initiated
and expired during the period. In Table 3 the program trading rates
of return are shown for the execute and hold strategy and the dynamic
program trading strategy for both of the assumptions of liquidation.
The comparison between the two strategies is summarized in Table 4.
As can be seen from the results in Tables 2 and 4, the dynamic pro-
gram trading strategy consistently outperforms the execute and hold
strategy. There are several important implications of the findings in
Tables 1 through 4. First, there exist arbitrageable opportunities in
the stock market using the abnormal disparities between the spot index
and its futures prices over time. For example, for Maxi MMI February
86 futures, there were 62 and 182 times of trading signals during the
sample period under the assumptions of simultaneous trading and delayed
trading, respectively, when the filter size is one standard deviation.
Also, as one would expect, as the trading rule was made more stringent
by increasing the filter size that the premiums or discounts had to be
before a position was taken, the number of trades declined. Second,
most program traders are better off not to hold their positions and
unwind them at the expiration of the futures contract but rather keep
trading their positions until the expiration. In the same example of
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Maxi MMI February 86 futures with the filter size of one standard devia-
tion, the execute and hold strategy and the dynamic program trading
strategy lead to the returns of .30% and 8.24%, respectively, under the
assumption of simultaneous trading. The corresponding returns are .26%
and 22.90% for the two different trading strategies, respectively, under
the more realistic assumption of delayed trading. Third, this implies
that the so-called "triple witching hour" and "crises at expiration"
may disappear as a problem because the program traders can generate
higher returns by actively trading their positions instead of waiting
until expiration. Fourth, as the premium or discount required for a
trade (i.e., the filter size) increased, the profitability of trading
decreased for dynamic program trading. Fifth, the passage of time does
not seem to be related to the frequency of arbitrage opportunities nor
with the profitability of program trading. This implies that the
opportunity for profitable program trading is not related to the amount
of program trading that is taking place. Normally one might expect as
the number of arbitrages increase, the profitability of the arbitrage
declines. Given the increased publicity and interest in program trad-
ing, the results of this study indicate that the increased awareness
has not diminished the profitable opportunities.
However, the readers are warned to be cautious when they compare
the returns following the execute-hold and the dynamic program trading
strategies because of the transaction costs. There are two kinds of
transaction costs, one is for trading futures and the other for trading
the baskets of underlying stocks. However, for institutional investors
who can afford to programming trading, the average transaction costs
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for trading spot securities is only around .08% ($1100 for $1,374
million trading). Besides, as pointed out earlier, the transaction
costs for futures trading are even lower than those for spot securities.
Thus the results in Tables 1 and 3 do not seem to be significantly
affected even after consideration of transaction costs.
The results in Tables 1 and 3 also hinge on the effectiveness of
futures for hedging spot positions or the so-called "portfolio insur-
ance." The portfolio insurance, in its most common form, involves
selling stock-index futures assuming that investors own the underlying
securities replicating the index. The columns, Return/Risk (Spot) and
Return/Risk (Portfolio) in Tables 1 and 3, represent the ratio of aver-
age returns of each trade to its standard deviation for the spot index
only and for the portfolio containing the index and its futures, re-
spectively. It appears that comparing the return to risk ratios, the
portfolio consistently outperforms the spot index. Even though we did
not assume that investors held the underlying securities necessarily
before trading in futures contracts and thus the results are not
directly applicable to portfolio insurance, those results suggest that
index futures contracts can be effective for hedging the stock portfolio
that replicate the underlying index of the futures.
V. Conclusion
Since the inception of stock index futures contracts, the program
trading by institutional investors based on the disparity between the
index and its futures price has been a major concern of investors and
the regulatory bodies. In this paper, we have tested the frequency of
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program trading and the potential return of such activity, using intra-
day transaction data for the Major Market Index, the Maxi Major Market
Index and their futures prices. Our results indicate that there exist
arbitrageable opportunities in the stock market using the abnormal
spread between the spot index and its futures prices over time. The
dynamic trading strategy developed in this paper appears to consistently
outperform the simple execute and hold to expiration strategy. However,
it is important to note that the arbitrage by institutional investors
is not without benefits to financial markets. First, increased trading
in stocks and futures contracts by institutions may enhance liquidity
in both markets. Second, those arbitrage transactions may lead even-
tually to efficient pricing mechanisms linking spot and futures markets.
To our best knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to provide
empirical evidence on potential return of aggressive program trading.
Further interesting issues remain to be investigated, such as the bene-
fits and costs of program trading and the portfolio insurance which
involves passive program trading using stock index futures.
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Footnotes
The "triple witching hour" represent the four Fridays a year when
index options, stock options and futures expire simultaneously.
2
Some previous studies have shown the conflicting results concern-
ing the impact of the futures market on the cash market. For example,
Cox (1976), Gardner (1976), Grossman (1977), Modest and Sundaresan
(1983), Peck (1976) and Turnovsky (1976) among others have shown that
the futures market plays an important role in stabilizing the spot
market.
3
In recent years, to ensure fast executions of orders, program
traders sometimes use dedicated phone lines to the exchange floor. In
addition, the Chicago Board of Trade has the DOT (Designated Order
Transmission) program, which enables traders to put orders for hundreds
of stocks into a computer and send them all to the floor.
4
When the futures price reacts to new information initially and
thus the change in the futures price is systematically related to the
subsequent change in the spot price, it is often called "the tail
wagging the dog effect." See Finnerty and Park (1987) for the tail
wagging the dog effect.
In fact, the MMI futures have often been blamed for volatile
swings in the blue-chip stocks. For example, on March 21, 1986, fran-
tic MMI futures trading was blamed for a plunge in the underlying
stocks. As the MMI plummeted 3% compared with declines of less than
2% in other indices, the 15 issues included in both the Dow Jones and
the MMI posted the day's biggest losses (see the Wall Street Journal
,
April 7, 1986).
See Business Week, April 1986.
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Table 1
Program Trading Results for Max! MMI*
Simultaneous Trading Delayed Trading
Dynamic Dynamic
Execute Program Execute Program
Contract Fi Iter Number of and Hold Trading Return/Risk Return/Risk Number of and Hold Trading Return/Risk Return ?.isk
Month
Sept. 85
Size
la
Trades
28
(%) (%) (Spot) (Portfolio)
1.56
Trades
92
(%) (%) (Spot) (Portfolio)
-.15 2.49 .61 -.17 7.32 .61 2. CO
2o 14 .28 1.60 .30 1.54 36 -.09 5.77 .65 1.55
3a 3 .36 .21 -.45 .51 17 -.12 3.73 .79 1.59
Nov. 85 la 16 -.08 1.32 .08 1.33 55 .20 5.02 .56 1.52
2o 9 -.08 1.02 .13 1.94 21 .20 2.99 .44 1.52
3a 5 -.08 .54 .27 2.36 13 -.08 2.61 .40 2.-9
Dec. 85 la 78 -.58 9.28 .29 2.05 290 -.61 35.23 .59 1.59
2a 34 -.46 5.74 -.03 2.24 98 -.61 17.48 .42 2.21
3o 14 .66 2.97 -.23 2.09 45 -.61 9.89 .35 1.92
Jan. 86 la 51 -.14 6.15 .17 1.93 186 .53 23.78 .48 1.93
2a 20 -.14 2.89 -.11 1.77 58 .53 10.83 .37 2.30
3a 9 -.14 1.37 -.14 1.42 21 .53 4.97 .66 1.55
Feb. 86 la 62 .30 8.24 .35 1.83 182 .26 22.90 .46 1.79
2a 17 -.30 2.77 .37 1.62 68 -.14 13.55 .43 1.79
3a 8 -.30 1.46 .91 .93 27 -.14 6.03 .73 2.22
Mar. 86 la 94 .96 12.49 .18 1.25 358 -.18 59.46 .49 1.12
2a 31 .96 4.46 -.01 .82 126 -.18 25.83 .41 1.C2
Apr. 86
3o 10 .96 1.51 .19 .95 47 -.18 8.90 .37 .55
la 76 .53 13.14 .47 2.67 258 -.21 46.30 .74 1.51
2a 20 .53 4.97 .13 2.32 69 -.16 19.73 .62 2.7D
3a 7 .53 2.48 .13 4.41 24 -.16 10.55 .65 3.22
May 86 la 60 -.37 8.75 .34 2.22 255 .55 44.67 .61 1.53
2o 17 -.37 3.63 .60 2.77 58 .55 14.39 .50 2.19
3a 9 -.37 1.99 .39 1.40 26 . -.35 9.47 .48 1.89
June 86 la 98 1.22 15.77 .11 2.03 426 -1.62 85.83 .54 1.05
2o 28 1.22 5.61 -.05 2.05 120 1.40 34.48 .38 .93
3a 12 1.22 3.08 -.26 1.36 45 1.40 15.83 .55 1.12
July 86 la 41 -.11 6.02 .24 1.56 192 .03 26.89 .53 2.C3
2o 15 -.01 3.03 .17 1.61 54 -.00 12.19 .37 2.30
3a 4 -.01 1.08 -.00 1.59 16 -.00 4.58 .39 1.97
*The return for "Execute and Hold" strategy Is from the first signal of trading to contract maturity. The return for "Dynamic Program Trading
n
is the cumulative rate of return of n trades from the first signal until the maturity of futures, using n (1+R.)-1 where R is the return
K i=1
} for ith trade. Return/Risk (Spot) and Return/Risk (Portfolio) represent the ratio of average return of each trade to its standard deviation
\J for underlying stocks only and for the portfolio of stocks and futures, respectively.
Table 2
Comparison of Execute and Hold to Dynamic
Program Trading Strategy (Maxi MMI)
Number of Times the Execute and Hold Outperformed
or Was Equal to the Dynamic Program Trading Strategy
Filter
Size
la
2a
3a
Simultaneous Delayed
Trading Trading
0/10 0/10
0/10 0/10
1/10 0/10
Table 3
Program Trading Results for MMI*
Simultaneous Trading Delayed Trading
Dynamic Dynamic
Execute Program Execute Prog ram
Contract Filter Number of and Hold Trading Return/Risk Return/Risk Number of and Hold Trading Return Risk Return/Risk
Mon th
84
Size
lo
Trades
9
(%) (%) (Spot) (Portfolio)
1.74
Trades
65
(%) (%) (Spo:1 (Port
1.
folio)
Aug. .29 1.81 .17 .24 15. 54 . 5; 53
2a 5 .29 .92 .43 1.54 21 .27 7. 26 .43 2. 41
3a 4 -.06 .79 .39 .87 8 .37 3. 16 .96 3. 36
Sept . 84 la 20 -.21 1.96 .16 .84 112 .64 24. 52 . 55 1. 58
2a 9 -.21 1.36 -.06 1.03 41 .68 10. 85 .41 2. 29
3a 4 -.21 .85 1.11 1.30 19 -.31 6. 71 .61 2. 84
Oct. 84 la 11 -.81 .52 .44 .30 123 -.61 21. 73 .62 1 45
2a 7 -.81 .10 .35 .15 47 -.42 11. 72 . 56 1 76
3a 5 -.81 .01 .17 .03 21 -.42 7 38 .13 2 36
Nov. 84 la 15 -.39 1.32 -.20 .96 102 -.96 16 28 .5- 1 12
2a 7 -.28 .63 -.38 1.51 40 -.91 8 77 . 51 1 76
3a 5 -.28 .41 -.21 1.17 19 -.82 6 14 .11 1 78
Dec. 84 la 35 -.84 3.90 -.00 .86 220 1.43 34 90 .42 1 37
2a 23 -1.06 3.39 -.06 .76 83 1.44 19 95 .37 2 08
) 3a 11 -1.06 1.94 .12 1.14 34 -1.11 11 85 .16 2 08
Jan. 85 la 18 -.74 1.43 .13 .96 113 1.22 17 63 .56 1 34
2a 11 .82 1.26 .65 .94 42 1.22 10 88 . 5- 1 62
3a 5 .83 .36 -.12 .60 22 1.22 7 69 .65 2 30
Feb. 85 - la 17 -.56 1.61 .30 1.37 126 1.04 16 96 .56 1 26
2a 7 -.50 .77 -.10 .73 42 -.66 8 02 .55 1 36
3a 2 -.50 -.22 -.41 -.35 21 -.66 5 66 .33 1 77
Mar. 85 la 29 -1.52 2.63 .18 .98 222 1.99 31 .87 .56 1 17
2a 19 -1.52 2.29 .01 .90 85 1.99 19 .75 .70 1 37
3o 12 1.77 2.28 .04 1.28 41 2.00 12 40 .52 1 28
Apr. 85 la 15 -.26 1.20 -.06 .71 152 .73 18 .58 .56 1 .50
2o 9 -.34 .77 -.32 1.44 48 -.43 9 .29 .7i 2 03
3a 5 -.47 .21 -.31 .42 25 -.60 5 .49 .16 1 76
May 85 la 11 -.21 .56 -.53 .48 128 -.67 16 .46 .55 1 .80
2o 7 -.21 .45 .35 .51 46 -.51 7 .46 . 26 1 .55
3o 7 -.21 .49 .33 .49 10 -.51 2 .13 .01 1 .41
Table 3 (cont'd.)
Program Trading Results for MMI*
Simultaneous Trading Delayed Trading
Dynamic Dynamic
Execute Program Execute Program
Contract Filter Number of and Hold Trading Return/Risk Return/Risk Number of and Hold Trading Return/Risk Return/Risk
Month Size
lo
Trades
30
(%) (%) (Spot) (Portfolio)
.38
Trades
223
(%) (%) (Spot) (Portfolio)
June 85 -1.02 1.20 .14 1.78 29.29 .49 1.49
2a 19 -1.02 .99 .16 .36 73 1.78 11.97 .26 1.39
3o 15 -1.02 .97 .03 .34 38 -1.29 8.72 .60 1.73
July 85 la 23 -.56 1.31 -.25 .58 99 .74 11.03 .41 1.13
2o 15 -.56 1.06 -.02 .63 45 -.59 8.29 .41 1.88
3o 12 -.37 1.20 -.01 1.11 21 -.46 5.36 .78 1.78
Aug. 85 lo 17 .44 1.30 .92 1.10 92 -.43 10.16 .46 1.44
2o 12 .44 .98 1.13 1.03 42 -.43 6.92 .33 1.81
3o 4 .44 .04 .35 .05 18 -.43 3.95 .04 1.89
Sept. 85 la 27 -1.28 1.81 .39 .50 182 -1.46 20.52 .48 1.18
2a 17 -1.28 .87 .21 .33 79 -1.34 14.12 .51 1.43
3a 12 -1.28 .51 .25 .28 31 -1.34 6.31 .17 1.02
Oct. 85 la 15 -.36 1.38 -.25 .86 136 .44 14.81 .41 1.35
2a 8 -.36 .83 -.31 .89 43 .48 7.18 .26 1.70
3a 5 -.30 .49 -.18 .69 17 .47 3.68 .24 1.32 i
Nov. 85 la 12 .003 .96 -.32 1.16 95 .64 11.67 .23 1.37 1
2o 8 .003 .91 .39 1.07 33 .64 4.73 .13 1.13
3a 6 .003 .66 .42 .92 21 -.39 4.69 .05 1.43
Dec. 85 lo 41 .90 4.38 .07 1.48 230 1.03 33.25 .41 1.67
2a 25 .90 2.69 .11 1.17 80 1.03 15.80 .33 1.90
3a 17 .90 1.92 .20 1.17 33 1.03 7.56 .41 1.68
Jan. 86 lo 15 .35 1.56 .36 1.14 92 -.14 13.69 .50 2.28
2o 8 .44 1.27 -.01 1.59 37 -.08 8.36 .30 2.96
3a 3 .44 .11 -.98 .46 10 -.13 3.01 .40 2.74
Feb. 86 la 18 -.003 1.88 .29 1.45 94 -.29 13.71 .46 1.11
2o 12 -.003 1.65 .44 2.11 40 -.29 8.00 .49 .87
3o 6 -.003 .70 .38 1.58 15 -.29 2.53 .64 .73
Mar. 86 la 39 .44 5.83 .30 1.30 222 -.23 39.11 .50 1.89
2o 19 .44 3.31 .32 1.44 64 -.27 14.63 .54 2.44
3a 7 .44 1.46 -.13 1.17 27 -.25 8.13 .50 2.31
Table 3 (cont'd.)
Program Trading Results for MMI*
Simultaneous Trading Delayed Trading
Dynamic Dynamic
Execute Program Execute Program
Contract Filter Number of and Hold Trading Return/Risk Return/Risk Number of and Hold Trading Return/Ris:-. Return/Risk
Month Size
la
Trades
29
(%) (%) (Spot) (Po rtfolio)
1.73
Trades
148
(%) (%) (Spot) (Portfolio)
Apr. 86 -.24 4.95 .39 .36 31.38 .55 1.79
2a 10 -.24 2.67 -.08 2.45 38 .31 11.09 .45 :.18
3o 2 -.17 .57 -.92 2.17 13 .39 5.92 .98 2.53
May 86 la 14 .71 1.55 .09 1.09 128 .83 26.10 .35 1.05
2a 6 -.31 .68 .45 1.17 34 1.65 12.02 .52 1.15
3a 5 .31 .62 .34 1.09 10 .03 4.24 .37 1.59
June 86 la 40 .87 4.45 .27 1.13 244 .81 47.69 .60 1.86
2a 18 .87 2.07 .47 .87 57 -.46 16.62 .47 1.86
3o 12 -.46 1.12 .86 .81 20 .96 7.39 .61 1.99
July 86 la 19 .12 1.92 .06 1.55 122 .24 18.64 .43 1.12
2o 10 .12 1.33 .26 2.28 34 .44 6.73 .28 1.27
3a 7 .05 1.04 .28 2.15 9 .44 3.66 .27 ,85
*The return for "Execute and Hold" strategy is from the first signal of trading to contract maturity. The return for "Dynamic Prcgraz Trading
n
is the cumulative rate of return of n trades from the first signal until the maturity of futures, using n (1+R.)-1 where R. is the return
i=l
for ith trade. Return/Risk (Spot) and Return/Risk (Portfolio) represent the ratio of average return of each trade to its standard devia-
tion for underlying stocks only and for the portfolio of stocks and futures, respectively.
Table 4
Comparison of Execute and Hold to Dynamic
Program Trading Strategy (MMI)
Number of Times the Execute and Hold Outperformed
or Was Equal to the Dynamic Program Trading Strategy
Filter Simultaneous Delayed
Size Trading Trading
la 0/24 0/24
2a 0/24 0/24
3a 3/24 0/24


